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1. Yåska's Nirukta and Plato's Cratylus are two texts which belong to two entirely 
different cultures (India and Greece respectively) and which deal essentially with one 
and the same problem. Both try to bring order to a phenomenon which is extremely 
wide-spread — not only in ancient India and early Greece, but in probably all pre-
modern cultures — the phenomenon of what I will call "semantic etymologizing". 
 A semantic etymology is to be distinguished from a historical etymology. A 
historical etymology presents the origin or early history of a word; it tells us, for 
example, that a word in a modern language is derived from another word belonging to 
an earlier language, or to an earlier stage of the same language. The English word 
militant, for example, is derived from Latin militans through the intermediary of French 
militant. And the Hindi pronoun maiµ ‘I’ is derived from Sanskrit mayå through 
Prakrit mae (Oberlies, 1998: 17). Semantic etymologies do something different. They 
connect one word with one or more others which are believed to elucidate its meaning. 
The god Rudra, for example, has that name according to the Vedic text called Íatapatha 
Bråhmaˆa (6.1.3.10), because he cried (rud-) in one story that is told about him. 
Semantic etymologies tell us nothing about the history of a word, but something about 
its meaning. 
 Semantic etymologies have largely gone out of fashion these days. Most 
sensible people have serious doubts about the possibility of finding the meaning of just 
any word by comparing it with other, more or less similar words. We tolerate such 
semantic etymologizing from children, who indulge in it quite freely, as Jean Piaget 
(1925) and others after him have shown. We are less tolerant with respect to adults who 
do so; the person who analyzes the word contentment as concerning being content with 
men, or with tea (content-men-t), is categorized as schizophrenic by modern 
investigators, perhaps rightly so.1 
                                                
*  I thank Einar Thomassen, editor of Numen, for useful criticism. 
1 So Werner and Kaplan (1963: 259), citing a patient of Maria Lorenz (1961: 604). 
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 And yet semantic etymologies are wide-spread in all pre-modern cultures. Here 
are a few examples from some cultures different from ancient and classical India2:  
 In the Sumerian myth of Enki and Ninhursag the former is cured when 
Ninhursag causes deities to be born corresponding to Enki's sick members: "The 
correspondence between the sick member and the healing deity rests on the ... 
etymologizing of the ancient scribes; the Sumerian word for the sick organ contains at 
least one syllable in common with the name of the deity. Thus e.g. one of the organs 
that pained Enki was the ‘mouth’, the Sumerian word for which is ka, and the deity 
created to alleviate this pain is called Ninkasi; similarly, the goddess born to alleviate 
the pain of the rib, the Sumerian word for which ti, is named Ninti, etc." (Kramer, 
1969: 37 n. 13). 
 An ancient Egyptian text carved inside two pyramids dating from the 24th 
century B.C.E. "is full of plays on words" such as: "O Atum-Kheprer, ... thou didst arise 
(weben) as the ben-bird of the ben-stone in the Ben-House in Heliopolis." (Wilson, 
1969: 3). Morenz (1957) refers to many ‘word-plays’ (Wortspiele) in Egypt3 and 
observes: "Für die alt-orientalischen Hochkulturen darf bemerkt werden, dass im 
Akkadischen (amâtu), im Hebräischen (dâbâr) und auch im Ägyptischen (md.t) 
derselbe Ausdruck ‘Wort’ und ‘Sache’ bezeichnet" (p. 24). Sauneron (1957: 133 f.) 
adds further examples and points out that ‘plays on words’ were considered to give an 
‘explanation’ of the world. 
 In the Hebrew Bible etymologies are common, especially in connection with 
names: Adam is linked with adama ‘earth’ (Gen. 2.7); woman, isha, is derived from 
man, ish (Gen. 2.23); Cain from qaniti ‘I have gotten’ (Gen. 4.1); etc. (Böhl, 1991: 163 
f.). 
 Kirk (1974: 57f.) emphasizes the use of etymologies in Greek myths and states 
(p. 58): "The poets of the Homeric tradition were already intrigued by the resemblance 
of the name ‘Odysseus’ to the verb odussomai ‘I am angry’. ... Pytho, the old name for 
Delphi, is derived [in the Hymn to Apollo, probably late in the seventh century B.C.E.] 
from the serpent destroyed there by Apollo and allowed to rot, puthein. ... Heraclitus 
the Presocratic philosopher found it significant that one word for a bow resembled the 
word for ‘life’ (biós and bíos), and Aeschylus related the name of Helen to the idea that 
she ‘took the ships’ (hele-naus), that of Apollo to apollunai, ‘destroy’, and that of Zeus 
to zên, ‘live’. Similar efforts at etymologizing characterize later Greek antiquity.4 
                                                
2 Several studies collect and discuss semantic etymologies from Vedic and post-Vedic Indian literature, 
e.g. Balbir, 1991; Bhavasar, 1969; Dange, 1989; Deeg, 1995; D¥k∑å, 1989; Gonda, 1955; Kahrs, 1998; 
Kantawala, 1967; 1973; 1993; Mehendale, 1963; Norman, 1980; Schneider, 1954; Shastri, 1997; Simson, 
1988; Singh, 1952; Singh, 1994; Tsuji, 1977; Verma, 1991. 
3 See further Sander-Hansen, 1946, esp. p. 19f. 
4 For a study of the etymologies in Homer, see Rank, 1951; also Kraus, 1987: 31 f. For an (incomplete) 
list of etymologies in Plutarch, see Strobach, 1997: 186 f. 
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 An example from medieval Europe is provided by the secret spiritual 
organization of the Fedeli d'Amore, whose representatives were active in France, Italy, 
and Belgium from the 12th century onward. They used a hidden language in order to 
keep their mystery of love secret. Love for them is a soteriological means, and 
accordingly the word amor ‘love’ is interpreted as a-mor ‘without death’:  
A senefie en sa partie 
Sans, et mor senefie mort; 
Or l'assemblons, s'aurons sans mort.5 
Caesarius of Heisterbach (ca. 1170 - ca. 1240) gives an explanation of the word mors 
‘death’ in his Dialogue on Miracles:6 
Though the transgression of the first created, death entered into the world. 
Hence death (mors) received its name from ‘biting’ (morsus). As soon as man 
bit (momordit) the apple of the forbidden tree, he incurred death and subjected 
himself as well as his whole posterity to its necessity. Death is also said to have 
come from ‘bitterness’ (amaritudine), because, as it is said, no pain in this life is 
more bitter than the separation of body and soul. Elsewhere he explains the 
word puer ‘boy’: "Puer (‘boy’) signifies purus (‘pure’)".7 
 The Chinese language, with its many homonyms, is particularly suited to 
connect unrelated things that have the same name; the link with what we call semantic 
etymologizing seems obvious. Indeed, "Han commentators applied a form of correlative 
thought in their philological studies, frequently explaining the meaning of obscure 
characters by sound analogy on the assumption that a phonetic correspondence 
indicated a semantic relation".8 "Sometimes highly complex circular shou emblems 
[symbols of long life or immortality] had incorporated into their design a swastika 
(pronounced wan), to express by a pun the concept of wan shou, meaning ‘ten thousand 
years of long life’." Similarly: "The endless knot [was] interpreted ... as symbolizing 
Buddha's intestines (ch'ang). ...[S]ince its name, ch'ang, made a pun on the word for 
long, the whole figure ... symbolized [to the later Chinese] a long life ...,"9 etc. Emperor 
Wang Mang "had the ‘screen-walls’ fu-ssu of the parks of the Wei and the Yen tombs 
pulled down, so that the people should not ‘think again’ fu-ssu (of the Han Dynasty)" 
(Ts'eng Chu-shen, 1949: 126). An example closer to our time is found in the weekly 
journal Newsweek of July 6, 1987, p. 18: "Hong Kong's new British governor, Sir 
David Wilson, bowed to local tradition by changing his Cantonese name, Ngai Tak-
ngai, shortly before assuming office last April. Its characters were homophones for the 
                                                
5 See Eliade, 1986: 112. 
6 Cited in Zaleski, 1988: 50. 
7 Cited in Zaleski, 1988: 52. 
8 Henderson, 1984: 19-20. 
9 Cammann, 1962: 98, 99-100. I thank Ms. Michèle Boin for this and the following reference. 
ETYMOLOGY AND MAGIC   4 
 
 
phrase ‘so hypocritical it's dangerous’; his new moniker, Wai Yik-shun, means 
‘guardianship’ and ‘trust’, conjuring up more soothing images to colony residents ..." 
 An example from ethnographic records is the following: Among the inhabitants 
of the Trobriand islands the word vatuvi occurs in a magical formula.10 This word has 
no grammatical form; it is neither noun nor verb. Malinowski (1935: II: 249, cf. p. 260-
61) observes: "the real etymological identity of this word will define it as connected 
with vitawo, or the prefix vitu-, and the word vituvatu, ‘to institute’, ‘to set up’, ‘to 
direct’, ‘to show’. [It has] also ... fortuitous, but magically significant associations with 
vatu, ‘coral boulder’, ‘coral reef’, and the more or less real word va-tuvi, ‘to foment’, 
‘to make heal’."11 
 The word ‘etymology’ itself has an etymology which presents its meaning as 
‘discourse that makes known the true meaning of a word’, from Greek etumos ‘true’ 
and logos ‘word’. In other words, if we had to decide which of the two, historical 
etymologies or semantic etymologies, should most appropriately be called etymologies, 
there can be no doubt that the historical linguist would have to search for another term.  
 
2. The omnipresence of semantic etymologies, illustrated above, raises important 
questions: what do these etymologies mean? what are they supposed to explain and 
how? why do people invent them? 
 Yåska's Nirukta and Plato's Cratylus deal with these and related questions. I will 
present the positions of these two texts, beginning with the Nirukta. After that I will 
briefly discuss the issue how we, in the 21st century, should deal with these same 
questions. 
 First the Nirukta. This text is considered a ‘limb of the Veda’ (vedå∫ga), one of 
the auxiliary sciences needed to interpret the Veda. It can approximately be dated on the 
basis of the following reflections. There is reason to believe that Yåska knew Påˆini's 
grammar and must therefore be dated later than that famous grammarian (Thieme, 
1935: *23*-*24* (530-31); Bronkhorst, 1984: 8 f.). The Nirukta is known to Patañjali's 
Mahåbhå∑ya, and is therefore older than that text.12 The Mahåbhå∑ya was composed in 
or soon after the middle of the second century before the common era (Cardona, 1976: 
266), and Påˆini — according to some recent research that is not sufficiently taken into 
account by scholars, perhaps because it was published in German — appears to belong 
to the middle of the fourth century before the common era, or to the decennia 
                                                
10 Malinowski (1935: I: 96, II: 257) describes it as the most important formula in all Omarakana garden 
magic. 
11 Regarding the last association, va-tuvi, Malinowski observes (p. 260-61): "As a matter of fact, one or 
two natives ... gave me this explanation of the word when commenting upon the spell." It is not clear 
whether any native made the association with vatu explicit. 
12 Cp. e.g. Limaye, 1974: 9, 14, 15, 93. 
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immediately following it (Hinüber, 1989: 34-35; Falk, 1993: 304). Yåska must fit in 
between, so that we may date him approximately 250 B.C.E., which is well after most 
Vedic texts, including the prose portions called Bråhmaˆas, had been composed. 
 The Nirukta tries to make sense of, and bring order into, the semantic 
etymologizing that is common in the Vedic Bråhmaˆas. We will see that in doing so it 
secularizes and rationalizes this practice. In order to appreciate this procedure, we have 
to first look at semantic etymologizing as we find it in the Bråhmaˆas.  
 In etymologizing as we find it in the Vedic Bråhmaˆas the following features 
can be observed: 
1) Etymologies in the Vedic age were more than mere intellectual amusement. 
Knowing them was believed to be important: it will secure those who know them 
various advantages. 
2) There is a close connection between etymologies and myths. Etymological 
‘explanations’ refer, almost without exception, to myths.13 
3) Etymologies often deal with a hidden dimension of linguistic reality: they reveal 
hidden layers of language.  
4) The number of etymologies for each word is not confined to just one.14 
 Each of these features could be illustrated with the help of numerous examples. 
To keep things simple, I will give just one or two examples for each. 
ad 1) Some passages are quite explicit about the importance and advantage of 
knowing certain etymologies.15 The following one is from the Taittir¥ya Bråhmaˆa 
(3.11.8.7-8; tr. Witzel, 1979: 13):16 
Prajåpati (the creator god) did not know how to give the sacrificial fee 
(dak∑iˆå). He put it in his right hand (dak∑iˆa˙). He took it, speaking the ritual 
formula (mantra): ‘For fitness (dak∑a) I take you, the sacrificial fee (dak∑iˆå).’ 
— Therefore he became fit (adak∑ata). The one who knowing thus receives 
the sacrificial fee (dak∑iˆå), becomes fit (dak∑ate). 
This passage clearly indicates that the etymological link which supposedly exists 
between the sacrificial fee (dak∑iˆå), the right hand (dak∑iˆa), and fitness (dak∑a), must 
be known. This knowledge guarantees that he who knows, having received the 
                                                
13 One is here reminded of Max Müller's "etymological method" of studying myths. See van den Bosch, 
1993: 188 f. In a lecture delivered at the University of Oslo on February 9, 1996, Eivind Kahrs has 
suggested that Müller may have been influenced by the chapters on divinities of Yåska's Nirukta. 
Something like Müller's method has still been used by some authors in the present century; see Kraus, 
1987: 17. 
14 Cf. Deeg, 1995: 397 f. The same is true for ancient Greece; see Lallot, 1991: 137 f. Ovid gives at times 
two etymologies for one word: At focus a flammis et quod fouet omnia dictus ("le foyer tire son nom des 
flammes et du fait qu'il réchauffe tout"; Desbordes, 1991: 155). Various rabbinical etymologies of one 
and the same word are simultaneously presented; Böhl, 1991: 162. 
15 Cp. Deeg, 1995: 411 f. 
16 Cf. Gonda, 1991: 177. 
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sacrificial fee, becomes fit. Etymology is here more than a mere intellectual help to find 
the meaning of a word; more precisely, it is no such thing at all. Etymologies reveal 
links between words, and therefore between the objects they denote, links which it is 
advantageous to know. 
ad 2) The passage just cited illustrates that etymological explanation usually involves 
reference to myths. Occasionally it appears that etymologies have given rise to myths.17 
This may be illustrated by Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa 3.6.1.8-9: "Now, the gods and the 
Asuras, both of them sprung from Prajåpati, were contending. Then all the plants went 
away from the gods, but the barley plants alone went not from them. The gods then 
prevailed: by means of these [barley-grains] they attracted to themselves all the plants 
of their enemies; and because they attracted (ayuvata, from yu) therewith, therefore 
they are called yava ‘barley’." (tr. Eggeling). 
ad 3) A hidden layer of language is revealed in Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa 6.1.1.2:18 
Indra, by his power (indriya), kindled those [other] vital airs from the midst; and 
inasmuch as he kindled (indh), he is the kindler (indha): the kindler indeed, — 
him they call ‘Indra’ cryptically, for the gods love the cryptic.19 
We learn that Indra's ‘real’ name is Indha, not Indra. We learn from this and many other 
passages that things and persons (including gods) have a real name which corresponds 
to their essence. This real name is sometimes hidden, "for the gods love the cryptic". It 
seems clear that both the gods themselves and human beings use ‘incorrect’ forms such 
as Indra. Sometimes however the gods are said to use the correct forms, only human 
beings using incorrect forms. So at Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa 1.1.4.4: "He takes the skin of a 
black antelope by means of [the formula] ‘thou art protection, [a bestower of] bliss 
(ßarman)’, for carman is its name among men, but ßarman is that used among the gods." 
(tr. Gonda, 1988: 248). 
ad 4) Different etymologies of one and the same word (often a name) are frequently 
met with, sometimes even in one and the same text. A passage from the Íatapatha 
Bråhmaˆa (10.6.5.5) links the name Aditi to the root ad. But another passage from the 
same Bråhmaˆa has an altogether different explanation (7.4.2.7): "Aditi is the earth, for 
this earth gives (dadate) everything here." Besides the etymology of Indra discussed 
above (from indh), the Taittir¥ya Bråhmaˆa (2.2.10.4) offers an altogether different one: 
"No one withstood this power (idam indriyam) in him. That is why he is called ‘Indra’." 
Two different etymologies of one word in one and the same passage occur at Íatapatha 
                                                
17 Cf. Devasthali, 1965: 13 f. Also in ancient Egypt certain myths appear to be based on etymologies; see 
Malaise, 1983. 
18 See in this connection Charles Malamoud's article "Les dieux n'ont pas d'ombre: remarques sur la 
langue secrète des dieux dans l'Inde ancienne": Malamoud 1989: 241-252, originally published in 1984 
(Traverses 30-31, p. 86-94). 
19 Deeg (1995: 406 n. 302) points out that these ‘secretive’ etymologies are not confined to Vedic 
expressions, as had been claimed by Bhavasar in an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Poona, 1969). 
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Bråhmaˆa 11.1.6.7: "The gods were created on entering the sky; and this is the godhead 
of the gods (deva) that they were created on entering the sky (div). Having created 
them, there was, as it were, daylight from him (i.e. Prajåpati); and this also is the 
godhead of the gods that, after creating them, there was, as it were, daylight (divå) for 
him." (tr. Eggeling) 
 Summing up: The etymologies in the Bråhmaˆas were believed to bring to light 
connections between objects that are normally hidden. Similarities between words can 
reveal those connections. More often than not these connections link the objects 
concerned with the mythological realm, i.e., with a reality which is not directly 
accessible to our senses. The fact that multiple etymologies for a single word are 
frequently met with, suggests that the connections established with their help constitute 
a network rather than a one to one correspondence. The practical advantage of these 
etymologies is that they allow man to obtain knowledge about these connections with 
the hidden reality. This knowledge — the texts emphasize it repeatedly — is of great 
importance: it can convey a number of advantages to him who knows. 
 This short résumé shows the extent to which the etymologies of the Bråhmaˆas 
fit in with other aspects of the religion that expresses itself through these texts. It is not 
only through etymologies that the Bråhmaˆas establish links with the hidden realm of 
mythology. And it is not only the knowledge of etymological links that is stated to 
convey numerous advantages. Nor is the idea of a network of connections only 
noticeable where the Bråhmaˆas present etymologies. In short, all the characteristic 
features that reveal themselves in our study of the etymologies are also found in other 
aspects of the religion of the Bråhmaˆas. 
 Similar links are established, not on the basis of verbal similarities, but on the 
basis of other similarities as well.20 Michael Witzel (1979: 11 ff.), following Karl 
Hoffmann (1975-76: II: 524 f.), speaks of ‘noems’ and ‘noematic categories’ to refer to 
traits that objects may have in common, and which are behind the "identifications" 
which are so typical for these texts. In the pravargya ritual, for example, the glowing 
red pot is identified with the sun (Witzel, 1979: 2), and the common features between 
these two objects are easy to guess. In a more recent publication Witzel puts it like this 
(1996: 169): "The matter may be summarized as follows: any two objects, ideas, 
entities can be linked with each other by establishing connections of smaller or greater 
                                                
20 Cp. Brian K. Smith's (1989: 47) following observation, which sets the tone for his book Reflections on 
Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion: "I would suggest here, and will be at pains to prove thoughout the 
remainder of this study, that there is a philosophical center around which all Vedic thought resolves. That 
center I will call resemblance. [This] concept, I believe, underlies Vedic religious and philosophical 
discourse in its entirety. ... Universal resemblance, whereby entities, things, forces, activities, cosmic 
planes — indeed, all the components of the universe as a whole — have essential affinities to related 
others, helps us to reform our understanding of the Vedic preoccupation with making and finding 
connections." 
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similarity (bandhu, nidåna) between them. Then they are not only regarded as linked 
but as essentially ‘identical’ — at least within the framework of the ritual. Whatever is 
done to one object or entity affects the other. ... The identifications or homologies can 
cover a single aspect of the two or three entities involved (even the number of 
syllables of the word signifying both entities) or they can cover a larger number of such 
links. To discover them is the aim of much of the discussion in the Bråhmaˆa style 
text." 
 The following characterization of Vedic thought is found in Brian K. Smith's 
Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion (1989: 80-81): "Connection thus 
bring together the immanent and the transcendent in such a way that the inaccessible is 
made accessible by the play of resemblances, and the manifest is fulfilled by 
participation in the transcendent. The universal elements, emitted from the Cosmic One, 
attain their full, actualized reality only when linked one to another and to their point of 
origin. Such a composition based on connection rejoins the Cosmic One into a unity of 
parts in which the simple and the limited — while remaining simple and limited — 
participates in the whole, the unlimited. Each particular ‘name and form’ can realize its 
true nature only by finding its place in this chain of resemblance — or, rather, by being 
placed ‘in bondage’ with all of its counterparts under the umbrella of the prototype. 
Universal resemblance keeps separate while it unifies, its specific economy regulated 
by avoiding the extremes of identity and individuality." 
 Both the notion of "identification" and that of "resemblance" in this connection 
have been criticized by Albrecht Wezler (1996), who draws attention to the fact that 
some "identifications" do not connect with the mythical realm, i.e., with the 
transcendent. Sometimes also an explicit justification is given which has nothing to do 
with resemblance, but all the more with other factors, such as a causal link, or 
something else. While Wezler's cautionary observations may no doubt contribute to a 
fuller understanding of the texts concerned, there is no reason as yet to doubt that many 
of these "identifications", like many of the etymologies, establish a link with the 
transcendent. Indeed, the fact that resemblance (phonetic resemblance) plays such an 
important role in the etymologies, is an argument — if such was needed — in support 
of the importance of resemblance in at least a considerable part of the "identifications". 
 
 The Nirukta — it was stated before — tries to make sense of, and bring order 
into, these etymologies. How does it do so? Here we have to keep in mind that Yåska, 
being most probably a Vedic Brahmin, could not reject the validity of these 
etymologies. Their validity was, for him, beyond doubt. His question was rather: how 
have they been arrived at? and, how does one establish new ones? The fact that he 
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asked these questions and looked for general rules underlying the etymologies of the 
Bråhmaˆas no doubt betrays Yåska's intellectual distance from the etymologies he tried 
to understand. It is certainly no coincidence that most of the four features which 
characterize Vedic etymologizing and which were enumerated above, no longer 
characterize Yåska's procedure. His etymologies do not typically establish a link with 
the mythological realm; nor do they as a rule reveal hidden layers of language. They are 
still secret, but no longer for the concrete reasons given for this in the Bråhmaˆas. The 
one feature that remains valid for Yåska's etymologies is that there can be several 
etymologies for one word. 
 It was pointed out above that the enumerated features of Vedic etymologizing 
fitted very well into Vedic religion. Etymologizing was just one more way of 
establishing the links that according to Vedic religious understanding link different 
objects belonging to this and the other world. Since in Yåska's etymologies the religious 
dimension (connection with the mythological realm; access to a hidden layer of 
language) has virtually disappeared, we may conclude that Yåska's religious views were 
no longer those of the Vedic period. This, however, raises the question what good 
etymologies would be for him. 
 A number of rules are formulated in the second chapter of the Nirukta that 
should help the student to find etymologies on his own.21 The most important among 
these rules is no doubt the one that etymologizing should, first of all, be guided by the 
meaning of the word concerned; phonetic considerations play a less important role: 
"One should examine [a word] being intent upon [its] meaning, with the help of some 
similarity in function (with other words). When not even such a similarity is present 
one should explain on the basis of similarity in a syllable or in a single sound." (Nirukta 
2.1). In the case of unknown words, therefore, one looks at the context in which they 
occur (usually a Vedic hymn), so as to get a first impression as to their meaning. 
Subsequently one looks for other words (they have to be verbal forms, according to the 
Nirukta) which are more or less similar to the word under study. Semantic 
considerations, however, come first. So a verbal form which is less similar but closer to 
the expected meaning is to be preferred to a more similar verbal form which does not 
support the desired meaning. And words which are known to have several meanings, 
have also several etymologies. An example is the word go: "The word go is a name for 
‘earth’ because it goes (gata) far and because living beings go (gacchanti) on it. Or [it is 
a name] of something22 which moves (gåti). o [in go] is a nominal suffix. Moreover, 
[the word go] is the name of an animal (viz. ‘cow’) for this same reason. ... Also a bow-
                                                
21 For a full discussion, see Deeg, 1995: 78 f. 
22 This interpretation of Sanskrit gåter vå follows Eivind Kahrs, 1984: § 12; cp. Kahrs, 1998: 115, 132-
133. 
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string is called go ... because it sets arrows in motion (gamayati)." (Nirukta 2.5) And if 
one does not find verbal forms that resemble the word to be explained, one should not 
be discouraged. 
 The Nirukta gives no explanation as to why ‘etymologies’ should be valid at all. 
The explanation which has been offered by most modern interpreters of the text, viz., 
that the ‘etymologies’ tell us something about the history of the words concerned, is 
demonstrably incorrect.23 It appears that the author of the Nirukta did not look upon 
language as something developing in the course of time. This is not surprising in the 
Indian context; we know that the Veda, and therefore also the language in which it is 
composed, came to be looked upon as eternal, i.e., without beginning. It is not 
impossible that this view existed already in the days of the Nirukta, i.e., several 
centuries before the beginning of the Christian era (see above). Classical India, unlike 
for example classical Greece, could believe in the existence of one ‘real’ language, all 
other languages being, at best, imperfect reflections of it. 
 One way to account for the validity of semantic etymologies based on the 
similarity between words (for those who accept this validity) would be to claim that 
there are ultimate meaning bearers, such as individual sounds or small groups of them, 
each with its own specific meaning. Plato's Cratylus does indeed explore this 
possibility, as we will see below. However, the Nirukta does not adopt this position.24 
Interestingly, a number of early Buddhist texts, while referring to Brahmanic learning, 
mention the term ak∑araprabheda (Pali akkharappabheda),25 which O. Franke (1913: 87 
n. 6) translates "Unterscheidung der Silben"; the Pali commentators specify that the 
reference is to two forms of linguistic analysis, one of them being etymologizing. It 
seems, therefore, that the idea that individual sounds or syllables have meanings of their 
own, and that this presumed fact explains semantic etymologies, was not unknown in 
ancient India, even though the Nirukta does not mention it. 
 The grammarian Patañjali (2nd century B.C.E.), the most authoritative 
commentator on Påˆini's grammar, considers and subsequently rejects the proposal that 
individual sounds have meanings.26 Among the reasons he adduces — following his 
predecessor Kåtyåyana, whose statements (vårttika) he comments — is the following: 
In grammatical derivations there can be transposition, loss, addition and modification of 
sounds. If sounds had meanings, these meanings, too, would undergo transposition, 
loss, addition and modification. Such is not however the case. This argumentation is of 
                                                
23 This is shown in Bronkhorst, 1981; Kahrs, 1983, 1984. 
24 It does occasionally present ‘deep’ forms which ‘hide’ behind the surface forms; e.g. Nir. 1.1: te 
nigantava eva santo nigamanån nighaˆ†ava ucyanta ity aupamanyav[a˙] "According to Aupamanyava, 
these [lists of words] are called nighaˆ†us, being really nigantus because they are quoted (nigamanåt)." 
25 See Bronkhorst, 1989: 129 f. 
26 Mahåbhå∑ya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay 1880-1885, vol. I p. 30-32. 
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particular interest, for Yåska's Nirukta (2.1-2) had presented almost exactly the same 
reasons in order to show that in etymologizing one is free to transpose, remove, add or 
modify sounds. This proves that — in the opinion of their practitioners — neither 
etymologizing nor grammar could possibly arrive at meanings of individual sounds.27 
 This does not mean that the idea of "real" meanings attaching to individual 
sounds was abandoned by all in ancient India. A different attitude towards language, 
and towards sacred utterances in particular, manifests itself in the religious literature of 
India. This different attitude is interested in the deeper — some would say: mystical — 
meaning of these utterances. Already the Vedic texts sometimes ascribe significances to 
parts of words that have nothing to do with their ordinary meanings. For example, the 
three syllables of the word pu-ru-∑a ‘person, self’ are stated to correspond to a threefold 
division of the self: to be placed in the world of the sacrificer, in the world of the 
immortal(?) and in the heavenly world respectively (Aitareya Bråhmaˆa 3.46 (15.2)). 
The three syllables of h®-da-yam ‘heart’ are explained as follows: "h® is one syllable. 
Both his own people and others bring (h®) offerings unto him who knows this. da is one 
syllable. Both his own people and others give (då) unto him who knows this. yam is one 
syllable. To the heavenly world goes (eti [pl. yanti]) he who knows this."28 The 36,000 
syllables of 1000 b®hat¥ hymns correspond to as many days of a hundred years, 
according to the Aitareya Óraˆyaka (2.2.4). The seventeen syllables of the utterances o 
ßråvaya, astu ßrau∑a†, yaja, ye yajåmahe and vau∑a† are the seventeenfold god Prajåpati 
(Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa 12.3.3.3). 
 More detailed are two passages from the Chåndogya Upani∑ad. The word 
satyam ‘truth’ is said to consist of three syllables sa-t¥-yam;29 sa(t) is the immortal, ti the 
mortal, with yam the two are restrained (root yam-) (Chåndogya Upani∑ad 8.3.5). The 
three syllables of ud-g¥-tha ‘chanting of the Såmaveda’ mean respectively ‘breath’ — 
because by it one stands up (utti∑†hati) —, ‘speech’ (g¥r), and ‘food’ — in which all this 
is established (sthita) — (Chåndogya Upani∑ad 1.3.6). The second of these two 
analyses tries to keep contact with the 'real' meanings of the syllables concerned, the 
first one does not even try to do so. 
 The B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad contains a story (5.2) that is interesting in the 
present context. The gods, men and the demons dwelt with father Prajåpati as students 
of sacred knowledge. Asking for instruction, Prajåpati uttered the same syllable da to 
each of them. The gods understood this as dåmyata ‘restrain yourself’, the men as datta 
                                                
27 An exception must of course be made for such verbal roots and other grammatical elements as consist 
of just one sound. 
28B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad  5.3; tr. Hume. 
29t¥ is the dual of ti, as Keith (1909: 207) pointed out. The analysis sat-ti-yam is also found in 
B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad 5.5.1, Aitareya Óraˆyaka 2.1.5. For another explanation of satyam (= sat + 
tyam), see B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad 2.3, Kau∑¥taki Upani∑ad 1.6, Taittir¥ya Upani∑ad 2.6; further 
Kudelska, 1995. 
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‘give’, while the demons understood this same syllable da as dayadhvam ‘be 
compassionate’. The divine voice which is thunder repeats the same: da da da, which is: 
dåmyata, datta, dayadhvam. Therefore one should practice restraint (dama), liberality 
(dåna) and compassion (dayå). Unfortunately the passage does not explain what is the 
point of this story, and perhaps one should not attach too much significance to it. It may 
however be legitimate to surmise that it attributes three different meanings to the single 
syllable da, meanings which normally express themselves through the intermediary of 
the words dåmyata (or dama), datta (or dåna) and dayadhvam (or dayå).30 
 Concern with single syllables may also be visible in the explanation of the word 
ßarkara ‘pebble’ with the help of the syllable ßaµ ‘welfare’: ßarkara is called thus, while 
welfare (ßaµ) befell us.31 
 An early indication that individual speech sounds were looked upon as 
possessing powers may be found, according to Thieme (1985), in the last verse of the 
Maitråyaˆ¥ya Saµhitå, which is also the first verse of the Íaunak¥ya recension of the 
Atharvaveda. This verse reads:32 "The thrice seven that go around, wearing all the 
shapes — let the Lord of Speech put their powers into my body's [parts] today." Thieme 
argues that ‘the thrice seven’ are the sounds of language and shows how they can, and 
may have been, looked upon as constituting a list of 21 elements. He then concludes (p. 
565 (938)): "The basic sound units of the sacred language, amounting to the sacred 
number ‘thrice seven’, are the basic sacred elements of the sacred language. Being 
sacred, they are loaded with magic powers. Rehearsing them the brahmacårin will not 
only obtain the technical ability of correctly repeating and retaining what his teacher 
recites to him, he will, also, appropriate those magic powers: ‘May the Lord of Speech 
put their powers into my body's [parts] (or: in my body) today (i.e., at the beginning of 
my vedic studies)’." 
 These examples from Vedic literature33 point the way to a much more wide-
spread concern with the deeper significance of small groups of sounds, and even 
individual sounds. It manifests itself in the speculative analyses of the sacred syllable 
oµ and elsewhere, and reaches its apogee in certain Tantric texts, which attribute a 
                                                
30 Cp. Houben, 1997: 70. 
31 Taittir¥ya Bråhmaˆa 1.1.3.7: ßaµ vai no 'bhËd iti/ tac charkaråˆåµ ßarkaratvam/. 
32 Maitråyaˆ¥ya Saµhitå 4.12.1 (ed. von Schroeder p. 179 l. 14 f.) ~ Atharvaveda (Íaunak¥ya) 1.1 ~ 
Atharvaveda (Paippalåda) 1.6: yé trisapt≤˙ pariyánti vißvå rËp≤ˆi bibhrata˙/ våcáspátir bálå té∑åµ 
tan(ú)vò 'dyá dadhåtu me// tr. Thieme. Doubts regarding Thieme's interpretation of this verse have been 
raised by Deshpande (1997: 33 f.) 
33 Similar examples can be found in more recent literature. The Dev¥ Bhågavata Puråˆa (9.1.6-7; cited 
and translated in Jacobsen, 1999: 26-27) explains the word prak®ti in two ways, the second one dividing 
the word into the three syllables pra-k®-ti: "The pra-word means the most excellent sattva guˆa, k® means 
the middle rajas guˆa, and ti denotes the tamas guˆa. She whose own nature is triguˆa, is endowed with 
powers. She is superior in creating, therefore she is called prak®ti." (guˆe sattve prak®∑†e ca pra-ßabdo 
vartate ßruta˙/ madhyame rajasi k®ß ca ti-ßabdas tamasi sm®ta˙// triguˆåtmasvarËpå yå så ca 
ßaktisamanvitå/ pradhånå s®∑†ikaraˆe prak®tis tena kathyate//). 
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specific metaphysical significance to every sound of the Sanskrit language.34 These 
Tantric speculations present, in a way, the Indian counterpart of Plato's ‘primary names’ 
and the ‘primary sounds’ of the Stoics, to be discussed below. Yet there is a major 
difference. These Tantric speculations base themselves primarily on so-called b¥ja-
mantras, utterances which are usually devoid of ordinary meaning. The metaphysical 
meanings assigned to the individual sounds are not, therefore, meant to contribute to the 
meanings of ordinary words that contain them. No longer restrained by the shackles of 
ordinary language use, the Tantric authors could establish the meanings of all the 
sounds of the Sanskrit language.35 
 It will be clear that these Tantric speculations are far removed from the 
etymologies which form the subject matter of this study. We will not, therefore, study 
them in any detail. Be it however noted that these Tantric speculations have parallels in 
the Jewish Kabala and similar developments within Islam.36 Yet, though removed from 
etymologies, these speculations cannot be completely separated from them. They are, in 
a way, the ultimate outcome of the process of analysis which found its inspiration in 
those etymologies. 
 
 Where does this leave us with regard to the question as to how Indian thinkers 
explained semantic etymologies? During the Vedic period the validity of these 
etymologies was not questioned since they were based on the more general principle, 
not confined to language, that similar things are connected — or even identical — with 
each other. During the then following period this justification fell away, but people 
went on etymologizing. No satisfactory theoretical justification was however worked 
out, even though the idea that constituent syllables or sounds somehow possess 
meanings that account for the meaning of the whole word survived in various forms. 
 
                                                
34 See Padoux, 1990. These Tantric developments are not without precursors in Vedic literature. See, for 
example, the following passage from the Pañcaviµßa Bråhmaˆa (= Tåˆ∂ya Mahå Bråhmaˆa) (20.14.2) 
and Jaimin¥ya Bråhmaˆa (2.244; close to, but not identical with it): "Prajåpati alone was here. Våc alone 
was his own; Våc was second to him. He reflected, ‘Let me send forth this Våc. She will spread forth, 
pervading all this.’ He sent forth Våc. She spread forth, pervading all this. She extended upwards as a 
continuous stream of water. [Uttering the sound] a, he split off a third of it — that became the earth ... 
[Uttering the sound] ka he split off a [second] third — that became the midregions ... [Uttering the sound] 
ho he cast [the last] third upwards — that became the heaven." (tr. Holdrege, 1994: 44). The context 
provides no clue as to why exactly these sound have the effect described. 
35 See Padoux, 1990: 235 ff.; Ruegg, 1959: 108 f. 
36 For the Jewish Kabala, see G. Scholem, 1983: 55-99 ("Le nom de Dieu ou la théorie du langage dans la 
Kabale; mystique du langage"); for Sufism, see Schimmel, 1975: 411 ff. ("Letter symbolism in Sufi 
literature"). Staal (1979: 7) briefly refers to the parallelism between Kabala and the Tantric speculations 
under consideration. 
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3. The situation in ancient Greece is rather different from India, in that the Greeks 
and their successors did not look upon their language as the only true language.37 This 
complicated matters considerably, and it is not impossible that this fact is partly 
responsible for the relatively suspicious way in which the problem was often 
approached in the Western tradition. Yet there is a respectable list of thinkers who 
occupied themselves with it.38 
 Plato's Cratylus is the first full investigation of ‘etymologies’ that has survived. 
In this dialogue Socrates is engaged in a discussion with two other characters, Cratylus 
and Hermogenes. It is possible, but not certain, that Cratylus in real life represented an 
‘etymologist’; it seems however certain that the ‘etymological’ point of view did have 
real supporters. Plato's dialogue, i.e., the person of Socrates in it, initially seems to 
support it, but in the process of working it out in detail changes position. 
 The basic question discussed in the dialogue is whether "everything has a right 
name39 of its own, which comes by nature" (383a). Arguing that this is the case, 
Socrates is led to conclude that the initial lawgivers knew "how to embody in the 
sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object" (389b). 
Astyanax ‘Lord of the city’, for example, being the name of the son of Hector the ruler 
of Troy, is appropriate (392d-e) or, as he says earlier (385b f.), true. This example takes 
us right into the analysis of words in view of determining their appropriateness. This 
analysis does not however have to fit the word too closely. It doesn't matter if a letter is 
added or subtracted (393d). "Varieties in the syllables is admissible, so that names 
which are the same appear different to the uninitiated, just as the physicians' drugs, 
when prepared with various colours and perfumes, seem different to us, though they are 
the same, but to the physician, who considers only their medicinal value, they seem the 
same, and he is not confused by the additions. So perhaps the man who knows about 
names considers their value and is not confused if some letter is added, transposed, or 
subtracted, or even if the force of the name is expressed in entirely different letters. So, 
for instance, in the names we were just discussing, Astyanax and Hector, none of the 
letters is the same, except t, but nevertheless they have the same meaning." (394a-b). 
"We often put in or take out letters, ... and we change the accent" (399a). Originally the 
true nature of words was more easily recognizable, but people attach "more importance 
to euphony than to truth" (404d), they beautify names (408b), they add sounds merely 
for the sake of euphony (412e), to make the words prettier (417e), they "care nothing 
for the truth, but only for the shape of their mouths" (414d). "The original words have 
                                                
37 Note that right at the beginning of Plato's dialogue of that name, Cratylus is presented as holding the 
view "that there is a kind of inherent correctness in names, which is the same for all men, both Greeks 
and barbarians" (383a). 
38 See Kraus, 1987; Lallot, 1991. 
39 Rijlaarsdam (1978: 65 f.) discusses the use of the word ‘name’ (ónoma). 
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before now been completely buried by those who wished to dress them up, for they 
have added and subtracted letters for the sake of euphony and have distorted the words 
in every way for ornamentation or merely in the lapse of time" (414c); "they keep 
adding to the original words until finally no human being can understand what in the 
world the word means" (414d). In brief, "words get twisted in all sorts of ways" (421d). 
The ancient language, on the other hand, shows clearly the real sense of words (418b). 
It is also clear that "when anyone knows the nature of the name — and its nature is that 
of the thing — he will know the thing also, since it is like the name" (435d-e). It is 
striking to see that the factors specified in the Nirukta as to be taken into consideration 
in etymologising (transposition, loss, addition and modification of sounds) are found 
here, too. 
 The Cratylus contains a great number of practical examples of ‘etymologies’.40 
For our present purposes it is not necessary to discuss these in detail. It is more 
interesting to see how Plato, through Socrates, faces the problem of the multitude of 
languages. Greek is for him not the only language, nor indeed the only correct, or even 
the best language. The creators of other languages are clearly assumed to have taken 
equally great care to make names in those other languages ‘fit’ their respective objects. 
The ideal names are expressed differently in different languages: "Then, my dear friend, 
must not the lawgiver also know how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name 
which is fitted by nature for each object? Must he not make and give all his names with 
his eye fixed upon the absolute or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of 
names? And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the same syllables, we must not 
forget this ideal name on that account; for different smiths do not embody the form in 
the same iron, though making the same instrument for the same purpose, but so long as 
they reproduce the same ideal, though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it 
should be, whether it be made here or in foreign lands ... On this basis, then, you will 
judge the lawgiver, whether he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each 
thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse lawgiver, 
whether here or anywhere else" (389d - 390a). The result of this is that the 
‘etymological’ method can be applied to other languages too: "if foreign names are 
examined, the meaning of each of them is equally evident" (400b-c). However, "if we 
should try to demonstrate the fitness of [foreign] words in accordance with the Greek 
language, and not in accordance with the language from which they are derived, you 
know we should get into trouble" (409e). Socrates admits however that where he finds 
it hard to understand a word and its ‘etymology’, he applies the contrivance of claiming 
it to be of foreign origin (416a). 
                                                
40 They have been collected and systematized in Gaiser, 1974: 54-57. 
ETYMOLOGY AND MAGIC   16 
 
 
 The discussion of this device induces Socrates to take his investigation even 
further than heretofore, and it is this continued investigation which provides him with 
one of the arguments because of which in the end he turns against ‘etymologies’. His 
train of thought runs as follows: "If a person asks about the words by means of which 
names are formed, and again about those by means of which those words were formed, 
and keeps on doing this indefinitely, he who answers his questions will at last give up ... 
Now at what point will he be right in giving up and stopping? Will it not be when he 
reaches the names which are the elements of the other names and words? For these, if 
they are the elements, can no longer rightly appear to be composed of other names." 
(421d - 422a) This gives rise to a question: "How can the earliest names, which are not 
as yet based upon any others, make clear to us the nature of things, so far as that is 
possible, which they must do if they are to be names at all?" (422d-e) The answer 
proposed by Socrates is that "the name-maker grasps with his letters and syllables the 
reality of the things named and imitates their essential nature" (424a-b). Socrates admits 
that "it will seem ridiculous that things are made manifest through imitation in letters 
and syllables" (425d); yet there is no alternative, unless we were to believe that the gods 
gave the earliest names, or that we got the earliest names from some foreign folk and 
the foreigners are more ancient than we are, or resort to some other evasive tactic 
(425d-e). Socrates therefore proceeds to assign meanings to individual letters; it would 
take us too far to give a detailed account of his results, but the principle is simple: the 
phonetic nature of a sound corresponds to the object it denotes, the active sound rho, for 
example, expresses activity. By combining these individual letters, the lawgiver makes 
by letters and syllables a name for each and every thing, and from these names he 
compounds all the rest by imitation (427c). 
 Having reached this far, Socrates discovers an insufficiency in the view 
propounded, which he uses as one of his arguments against it: "If the name is like the 
thing, the letters of which the primary names are to be formed must be by their very 
nature like the things" (434a). But not infrequently a word contains sounds which have 
no right to be there, such as the sound lambda, which expresses softness, in the word 
skl„rót„s ‘hardness’(434d). One might of course argue that this is an added sound 
which does not really belong in this word, but this raises the question how it got there. 
The answer can only be ‘by custom’ or ‘by convention’, but this takes us back to the 
position which was intended to be refuted in the first place, viz., that the relationship 
between words and their objects is determined by convention. Socrates concludes: "I 
myself prefer the theory that names are, so far as is possible, like the things named; but 
really this attractive force of likeness is, as Hermogenes says, a poor thing, and we are 
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compelled to employ in addition this commonplace expedient, convention, to establish 
the correctness of names." (435c) 
 One of the things to be noted in this dialogue is the desire to identify the 
ultimate elements of language and their meanings. Indeed, Socrates turns against the 
position of Cratylus precisely because his attempt to connect the primary names with 
the things denoted does not succeed. 
 In contrasting the Cratylus with the Nirukta and with Indian etymologising in 
general, several important differences deserve our attention. It has already been pointed 
out that the Greeks did not look upon their language as the only true language. To this 
must be added that Plato speaks about words as having been created by a or several 
lawgivers ("with the dialectician as his supervisor"; 390d), which is in total contrast 
with the Indian conception of things. Indeed, the grammarian Patañjali (introduced 
above) made the famous, and opposite, observation that no one who is in need of words 
would go to a grammarian the way someone in need of a pot goes to a potter to have 
one made.41 The idea of words being made by anyone, human or superhuman, was 
totally unacceptable in India. For Plato, on the other hand, it is fundamental. What is 
more, the original name-givers were no ordinary persons (401b), and the suggestion is 
made that he who gave the first names to things (here the singular is used) is more than 
human (438c). The name-givers are sometimes called demiourgos (431e), and it is not 
impossible that Plato looked upon the original name-giver as close to, or identical with, 
the Demiurge, the maker of this world mentioned in some other dialogues (esp. 
Timaeus). This link is particularly interesting in that it connects etymologising with 
cosmology, a connection that came to play a role in the thought of later Platonic 
thinkers, as we will see below. 
 I will not pursue the further development of semantic etymologizing in classical 
Europe. The Stoics actively practiced it, as did the Alexandrian tradition of 
grammarians. The situation in European antiquity came to be somewhat complicated by 
the fact that some ideas about the development of one language out of another one 
came to be accepted. Latin, in particular, was often thought of as having derived from 
Greek. Myths, such as the one about the origin of the founders of Rome, supported this 
belief (Strobach, 1997: 85). When, therefore, an author like Plutarch derives Latin 
words from Greek words, he may intend his etymologies to be understood as histories 
of the words concerned. Whether all his etymologies are to be understood in this 
manner remains unclear (Strobach, 1997: 55 ff.). There can however be no doubt that 
texts like Plato's Cratylus deal with semantic etymologising, not with historical 
etymologies. 
                                                
41 Mahåbhå∑ya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay 1880-1885, vol. I p. 7-8. 
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 I think we are entitled to conclude from the above observations that early Indian 
and classical European thinkers were aware of some of the difficulties surrounding 
semantic etymologies. The author of the Nirukta tries to formulate the rules that permit 
us to obtain valid semantic etymologies, but does not feel free to doubt their validity. 
The author of the Cratylus, on the other hand, arrives at the conclusion that the validity 
of semantic etymologies almost inescapably implies that individual sounds have each 
their own meaning. Since he finds this difficult to accept, he raises doubts as to the 
validity of such etymologies. 
 
4. For us, modern researchers, the validity of semantic etymologies is no longer an 
issue: semantic etymologies are not generally valid. Neither Yåska's method nor Plato's 
speculations as to the meanings of individual sounds are acceptable to us. We are 
nevertheless confronted with the problem that many people apparently did accept these 
etymologies as valid, and our problem is to make sense of that. 
 Two directions are open to us. On the one hand, we can try to understand 
semantic etymologies against the background of their respective cultures; in other 
words, Indian semantic etymologies are to be explained in terms of Indian culture, 
Greek semantic etymologies in terms of Greek culture, and so on. Alternatively, we can 
see in semantic etymologies a universal phenomenon, not inherently linked to any 
particular culture, and therefore look for a universal explanation. The examples adduced 
in the preceding pages should have left no doubt that semantic etymologizing is indeed 
a universal phenomenon, which is in need of a universal explanation. However, before 
turning to it we will have to pay attention to the one serious attempt that has been made 
to understand Indian semantic etymologies as an Indian phenomenon. 
 Eivind Kahrs' recent study called Indian Semantic Analysis: The ‘nirvacana’ 
tradition (1998) presents a new and interesting hypothesis concerning semantic 
etymologies in classical India, not primarily Vedic etymologies. For Kahrs, 
etymologies are part of the Indian universe of discourse. That is to say, etymologies are 
part of the methods used in Indian culture to interpret its texts. The study of 
etymologies in India is therefore the investigation of a systematically applied means of 
interpretation (p. 9). By finding here patterns that are repeated over and over again, one 
may detect certain basic features of classical Indian traditions. "For the present 
investigation" — Kahrs states on p. 11 — "it is precisely the constant factors and the 
indigenous interpretations of them at various points in time which are of interest". 
 Kahrs’ study concentrates, as far as etymologizing is concerned, on the Nirukta, 
and on some Íaiva texts from medieval Kashmir. These texts use etymologizing as a 
conscious device. Briefly put, Kahrs claims (p. 174) that "it is possible to argue that 
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ultimately all nirvacanas (= semantic etymologies, JB) are to be understood according 
to a substitutional model". The arguments given to support this hypothesis fall into two 
distinct groups. 
 Chapter 4 ("The universe of Yåska") deals in great detail with the various ways 
in which nirvacanas are presented in the Nirukta. The most important ones of these, 
Kahrs argues on the basis of copious material, use essentially a genitive case ending. 
The most perfect way of presentation is of the type megho mehat¥ti sata˙, which 
literally means: "megha (‘cloud’) is of something really existing such that one can say 
[of it]: mehati ‘it rains’". The genitive ending finds expression in the word ‘of’ of the 
translation. 
 The next question is: what is the exact meaning of this use of the genitive? What 
does it mean to say that the word megha is of something of which one can say ‘it rains’ 
(mehati)? The most straightforward interpretation might seem to be that the word 
megha belongs to something, viz. a cloud, of which one can say that it rains. This 
would seem to make perfect sense. Yet Kahrs does not seriously consider this 
possibility. He rather translates phrases like this in the following manner: "megha is in 
the meaning of that which really exists so that one says [of it]: ‘it rains’" (p. 162; my 
emphasis). Yåska, according to Kahrs, employs a genitive to indicate a substitution 
procedure as well as to indicate that which is signified by a word and thus ultimately its 
synonym. The substitutional model, mentioned earlier, is thus based on a particular 
interpretation of the genitive. Is this a regular interpretation of the genitive in Sanskrit? 
 Kahrs claims it is. This kind of use of the genitive ending is called sthåna∑a∑†h¥ 
in Sanskrit grammatical literature. Kahrs believes that it is firmly rooted in ordinary 
Sanskrit (p. 234). He comes to the conclusion "that the usage of the sthåna∑a∑†h¥ is a 
well established feature of ordinary language" (ibid.). "It is evident" — he states on the 
same page — "that you could get the usage of the sthåna∑a∑†h¥ from the Sanskrit 
language itself". And again, one page earlier (p. 233): "Such a usage of the genitive is 
in accordance with established Sanskrit usage." 
 This all sounds rather favourable to Kahrs's main thesis. All that remains to be 
done, one would think, is cite some passages from classical or Vedic literature that 
show that such a usage of the genitive is indeed well established in Sanskrit. No attempt 
is however made to prove the point, so often repeated, that the substitutional use of the 
genitive is well established Sanskrit usage. The reason is easy to guess. The genitive of 
substitution may not be all that well established in Sanskrit. 
 An exception has to be made for grammatical literature. Påˆini's grammar, in 
particular, uses the genitive in this way. Kahrs rightly points out that "to interpret a 
genitive as a substitutional genitive is nothing remarkable in Sanskrit grammatical 
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literature" (p. 236). Then, however, he continues: "Nor is there anything ... which 
restricts such a usage of the genitive to grammatical texts." This is far from obvious. 
The substitutional genitive in grammar is a technical device which, like most other 
technical devices of grammar, is most unlikely to be valid anywhere else. Påˆini's 
grammar uses a number of technical terms and devices, which are properly introduced, 
and which claim no validity outside this grammar. The special use of the genitive is just 
one of such devices. It is introduced in sËtra 1.1.49 (∑a∑†h¥ sthåneyogå), which means, 
in Böhtlingk's translation: "Der Genitiv in einem Sûtra bezeichnet dasjenige, an dessen 
Stelle Etwas treten soll." The use of the genitive in Påˆini's grammar is therefore 
special, and should not, one would think, be used to elucidate the use of the genitive in 
other works. 
 Kahrs does not agree. He discusses in detail the portion of Patañjali's 
commentary (the Mahåbhå∑ya) on this sËtra of Påˆini, as well as the subcommentaries 
thereon, and finds there an argument which, in his opinion, "would not work were not 
the use of the sthåna∑a∑†h¥ firmly rooted in the usage of ordinary Sanskrit" (p. 234). 
This, and only this, makes him conclude "that the usage of the sthåna∑a∑†h¥ is an 
established feature of ordinary language". This conclusion, which is vital to Kahrs's 
thesis, depends therefore, not on an attestable feature of the Sanskrit language, but on 
the correct interpretation of a scholastic argument, and on nothing else. 
 Which is the argument which leads Kahrs to his conclusion? It is essentially this. 
Patañjali points out that the genitive case ending can have "one hundred meanings, or as 
many as there are," and that therefore sËtra 1.1.49 restricts , for Påˆini's grammar, the 
meaning of the genitive ending to the single meaning "that in the place of which 
something will be substituted" (p. 197). Kahrs is of the opinion that the sËtra can only 
restrict the meaning in this manner, if the meaning "that in the place of which 
something will be substituted" does already belong to the genitive ending. Normally the 
genitive ending expresses this meaning as well as all the other ones, but as a result of 
sËtra 1.1.49 only this meaning remains. 
 Since this part of Patañjali's comments — which follow a vårttika by Kåtyåyana 
— sets the tone for the then following discussion, it is important to understand it 
correctly. According to Kahrs these comments presuppose that the genitive covers, of 
its own, the substitutional meaning. From a purely logical point of view he is right. 
Logically speaking, the substitutional meaning must be one of the hundred meanings, 
"or as many as there are", that Patañjali assigns to the genitive case ending. But this is 
not the same as concluding that the substitutional genitive is a well established feature 
of Sanskrit in general. The general meaning of the genitive case ending is relation in 
general, more precisely: everything that remains after specifying the meanings of the 
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other case endings (P. 2.3.50: ∑a∑†h¥ ße∑e). Kahrs describes it as follows (p. 237): 
"A[∑†ådhyåy¥] 2.3.50 ∑a∑†h¥ ße∑e teaches that a genitive case ending is introduced to 
denote ‘the rest’ (ße∑a). According to the Kåßikåv®tti this rest is any relation, 
sambandha, which is not a kåraka-relation and different from the meaning of the 
nominal stem. In other words, a genitive case suffix is introduced to denote any relation 
sustained between entities, that is to say, any non-verbal relation in general, such as 
father-son, master-servant, part-whole, etc. The fact that two entities are mutually 
related by their appearance in a given context is expressed by the genitive case. But the 
particular type of relation is not specified." This, of course, includes an enormous lot. It 
includes, for example, the sense "uncle of", and in certain exceptional circumstances the 
Sanskrit equivalent of "John is of Mary" or "John belongs to Mary" will have to be 
interpreted as meaning "John is Mary's uncle". This is not however the same as saying 
that the meaning "uncle of" for the genitive case ending is a well established feature of 
the Sanskrit language. The situation is not different, as far as I can see, for the 
substitutional meaning of the genitive case ending. There is just no evidence that this 
meaning is a regular feature of Sanskrit. This does not change the fact that this 
meaning, like the meaning "uncle of", is somehow included in the hundred or more 
cases covered by the genitive. 
 It is interesting, but also somewhat puzzling, that Kahrs seems to agree with this 
conclusion. He cites (p. 238 ff.) the example devadattasya yajñadatta˙ "Devadatta's 
Yajñadatta", where the idea is that Yajñadatta is the son of Devadatta. He compares this 
with the grammatical rule (2.4.52) aster bhË˙ "of as, bhË". Then he remarks (p. 238): 
"Just what the relation is ... can not be known from the statement aster bhË˙  
alone, anymore than one knows from the statement devadattasya yajñadatta˙ just what 
relation obtains between Devadatta and Yajñadatta. But if yajñadatta˙ is replaced by an 
obvious relational term such as putra˙ ‘son’, the relation in question is immediately 
understood: Devadatta's son. Now, in the case of aster bhË˙, where bhË itself is no 
obvious relational term, the relation marked by the genitive is determined by the 
expression sthåne which defines the genitive [in Påˆini's grammar]. [The rule aster 
bhË˙,] then, teaches that bhË occurs in the sthåna of as in certain contexts, ..." Kahrs 
even refers to Någeßa's position, according to which sthåna  is  not a meaning of 
the genitive case; it rather conditions the relation which is the meaning of the 
genitive case (pp. 241 f.). He concludes on p. 248: "I think it proper to accept what 
Kaiya†a and Någeßa say, which also Annambha††a says: the sthåna is called a 
sambandha ‘relation’ metaphorically, because it is a necessary condition for the relation 
in question. Note that I have accepted what most Påˆin¥yas say, namely that the 
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sthåna  is  not itself a sambandha  and thus not something directly 
conveyed by the genitive ending ..." (my emphasis). 
 And yet, in the Epilogue (p. 268-269) the old position is back into place: "... 
there is nothing remarkable in interpreting a genitive as a substitutional genitive in the 
context of relations between linguistic elements. ... Nor is there anything in the 
discussions of A[∑†ådhyåy¥] 1.1.49 ∑a∑†h¥ sthåneyogå and the nirdißyamåna-paribhå∑å 
which prohibits such an interpretation within or without the boundaries of 
vyåkaraˆa .  ... the substitutional use of the genetive is part of the Sanskrit language so 
that any genitive in a suitable context could be interpreted in such a way." (my 
emphasis) 
 It should be clear that it is possible to have serious doubts with regard to the 
thesis that ultimately all Indian semantic etymologies are to be understood according to 
a substitutional model. Kahrs himself has such doubts. Towards the end of his book he 
makes the following remarks (p. 278): "In the light of the technical framework of the 
Nirukta it is of course also possible to adopt a different model for the interpretation of 
nirvacanas. On the view that the -te˙ and -e˙ forms are ablatives one would simply face 
statements that single out the verbal element which underlies the grammatical formation 
and identify the action or event considered the reason for a particular name. This is a 
possibility also if they are considered genitive forms, and it is no longer crucial to 
determine which case ending we are dealing with." He then adds that perhaps this 
model and the substitutional model are both simultaneously valid. Perhaps, but one 
cannot avoid the conclusion that the problem of the Indian semantic etymologies is not 
definitely solved with the help of the substitution model. 
 
5. It appears, then, that semantic etymologizing is a universal (human) 
phenomenon which is in need of a universal explanation. In order to make progress in 
this direction, we may observe that there is a shared element between semantic 
etymologies and so-called magical acts which are of almost universal occurrence in 
human societies.42 Both may be looked upon as expressions of the analogical mode of 
thought, to borrow a term from the anthropologist S.J. Tambiah. Both in etymologies 
and in magical acts (or what are often referred to as such) similarity frequently plays a 
determining role. It must suffice here to cite Evans-Pritchard's (1976: 177) following 
remark about the Azande: "The homoeopathic element is so evident in many magical 
                                                
42 Some authors (e.g. Brian K. Smith, 1989: 36 f.) object against the use of the word magic, claiming that 
this term indicates utter foreignness and difference of the activities concerned, that it distinguishes them 
from proper religion, that it emphasizes their problematic nature, etc. None of this is here intended. No 
claim is here made that there is such a thing as magic, or that the term has been, or can be, meaningfully 
used. The word has however often been used in academic literature in connection with activities that 
show some kind of similarity with the etymologies we are studying. The term is here merely used for 
convenience, without any claim as to the unity or coherence of the activities covered by it. 
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rites and in much of the materia medica that there is no need to give examples. It is 
recognized by the Azande themselves. They say, ‘We use such-and-such a plant 
because it is like such-and-such a thing,’ naming the object towards which the rite is 
directed." Similar objects are here brought into connection, just as similar words, or 
parts of words, are connected in traditional etymologies. It may be interesting to see 
what explanations practitioners and believers offer for the presumed efficacy of magical 
acts. 
 It appears that often the people concerned do not think much about this question. 
Hallpike (1972: 284; cited in Hallpike 1979: 157-58), e.g., maintains that the Konso 
never refer to any kind of force or supernatural power to explain their belief in the 
efficacy of their symbolism. Ohnuki-Tierney (1981: 44-45), similarly, observes that 
among the Ainu materia medica alone, without the involvement of a spiritual being or a 
ritual, is considered sufficient to effect a cure: "[T]he analogy between the physical 
characteristics of [the] beings used in materia medica and the illness ... generates the 
power of what Frazer once called ‘sympathetic magic’." Among the Nuer — Evans-
Pritchard observes (1956: 104) — magical substances have an efficacy in themselves 
and do not derive their power from Spirit.  
 Yet there are cases documented where people do speculate about the reasons 
why their magic works, or should work. These reasons can be some specific power, or 
the involvement of spirits. The Azande, Evans- Pritchard (1976: 177) observed, "do not 
think very much about the matter", yet they "see that the action of medicines is unlike 
the action of empirical techniques and that there is something mysterious about it that 
has to be accounted for."43 In the case of vengeance-magic, for example, they "say that 
the mbisimo ngua, ‘the soul of the medicine’, has gone out to seek its victim." These 
rationalizations themselves lead to other activities: "The virtue of a medicine is 
sometimes spoken of as its soul, and is believed to rise in steam and smoke when it is 
being cooked. Therefore people place their faces in the steam so that the magical virtue 
may enter into them. Likewise, Azande say that when they cook vengeance-medicines 
the soul of the medicine goes up in the smoke from the fire and from on high surveys 
the neighbourhood for the witch it goes forth to seek." (Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 200). 
Malinowski (1922: 423) observed that among the Kula the spirits "are not agencies 
which get to work directly [in magic]. In the Trobriand demonology, the magician does 
not command the spirits to go and set to work. The work is done by the agency of the 
spell, assisted by the accompanying ritual, and performed by the proper magician. The 
                                                
43 The attitude of the Azande towards witchcraft is not dissimilar: "But even to the Azande there is 
something peculiar about the action of witchcraft. ... They know that it exists and works evil, but they 
have to guess at the manner in which it works. ... They only know what the others know: that the soul of 
witchcraft goes by night and devours the soul of its victim." (Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 31). 
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spirits stand in the same relation, as the performer does, to the magical force, which 
alone is active. They can help him to wield it properly, but they can never become his 
instruments." On p. 427 Malinowski states that "magic ... is a specific power, ... an 
inherent property of certain words, uttered with the performance of certain actions ... 
The words and acts have this power in their own right, and their action is direct and not 
mediated by any other agency." Here the efficacy of magic is explained with the help of 
certain forces rather than spirits. "Much of the ‘sympathetic magic’ [said to underlie] 
the ‘Black Art’ of the Malays seems to work by control of spirits", according to 
Endicott (1970: 174). This is true to the extent that the manipulation of wax figures has 
been said to serve the purpose of giving the spirits an example of what is expected of 
them (Wilkinson, 1906: 73). The ‘medicines’ of the Zulu — the sympathetic 
associations of which with the desired effects is often plain (Berglund, 1976: 352f.) — 
"are believed to contain amandla, power" (id., p. 256), which is, however, not traced to 
any particular source (p. 257). 
 These examples show that the effectiveness of magical acts is not always taken 
for granted, and not therefore in all cases beyond the need of some form of explanation 
in the eyes of those who carry them out. Yet the explanations offered by the performers 
in these cases seem completely inapplicable to etymologies. This does not mean that 
there are no similarities. We have seen that the Vedic etymologies refer virtually 
without exception to a mythical reality, and that sometimes a myth appears to have 
been created under the influence of the etymology concerned. In both cases a hidden 
reality is postulated in order to explain the effectiveness of magical acts and of the 
validity of etymologies respectively. 
 At this point it will be interesting to consider the theories of Neoplatonism. This 
is what, in the words of R.T. Wallis (1972: 70), Plotinus (204-270 C.E.) thought about 
paranormal phenomena: "In these (i.e., paranormal phenomena) Plotinus, like virtually 
all his contemporaries, except the most determined atheists and materialists — by the 
third century A.D. a very rare species — firmly believed. Where he differed from many 
of them was in attempting to accommodate such phenomena to a rational, orderly view 
of the world. The basis of his explanation is the Stoic doctrine of ‘cosmic sympathy’, 
the view that, since the world is a living organism, whatever happens in one part of it 
must produce a sympathetic reaction in every other part. It is by studying and applying 
the relevant forces that magicians produce their effects." One might cite here Plotinus' 
Enneads IV.4.40: "But how do magic spells work? By sympathy and by the fact that 
there is a natural concord of things that are alike and opposition of things that are 
different, ..." (tr. Armstrong, 1984: 261). 
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 Neoplatonists after Plotinus frequently use the term ‘theurgy’.44 Wallis (1972: 
107) observes: "The methods of theurgy were essentially those of ritual magic, its aim 
the incarnation of a divine force either in a material object, such as a statue, or in a 
human being, the result being a state of prophetic trance. Its justification, most clearly 
expounded in Proclus' little essay On the Hieratic Art, is the magical ‘Principle of 
Correspondence’, the idea, first that each part of the universe mirrors every other part, 
and secondly, and more important, that the whole material world is the mirror of 
invisible divine powers; hence, in virtue of the network of forces linking image to 
archetype, manipulation of the appropriate material objects brings the theurgists into 
contact with the deities they represent."45 
 For our present purposes it is interesting to note that some Neoplatonists, among 
them Proclus and others, extended these ideas beyond magic to the field of language. 
There is a similarity between words and objects which is of the same type as the 
similarity which exists between a god and his statue: "Wie die Konsekrationskunst 
durch gewisse Symbole und geheime Zeichen die Standbilder den Göttern ähnlich 
macht ..., so bildet auch die Gesetzgebungskunst ... die Wörter als Standbilder der 
Dinge, indem sie bald durch solche bald durch andere Laute die Natur der Dinge 
abbildet."46 And again: "Just as the demiurgic intellect brings into existence in matter 
the appearances of the very first Forms it contains in itself, produces temporal images 
of eternal beings, divisible images of indivisible beings, and from beings which are 
really beings produces images which have the consistency of shadow, in the same way, 
I think, our scientific knowledge also, which takes as its model the productive activity 
of the Intellect, makes by means of discourse similitudes of all the other realities and 
particularly of the gods themselves: ... Since then it produces the names in that way, our 
scientific knowledge presents them in this ultimate degree as images of divine beings; 
in fact it produces each name as a statue of the gods, and just as theurgy invoked the 
generous goodness of the gods with a view to the illumination of statues artificially 
constructed, so also intellective knowledge related to divine beings, by composition and 
divisions of articulated sounds, reveals the hidden being of the gods."47 
 Since, then, words imitate their objects, one can arrive at a knowledge of objects 
through words, especially through etymologizing, i.e., through the constituent syllables 
                                                
44 Theurgy took as its authoritative basis the Chaldean Oracles which date from the mid-second century 
C.E.; see Johnston, 1997. 
45 Note that a Christian author like Pseudo-Dionysius does not hesitate to describe the eucharist as 
theurgy. Here "[t]he bread and wine are representations of divine power in the same way that divine 
names are ‘statues’" (Janowitz, 1991: 370). For divine names as ‘statues’, see below. 
46 Procli diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria, ed. G. Pasquali, Leipzig 1908, p. 19 l. 12 ff. Tr. 
Hirschle, 1979: 12. 
47 Platonic Theology (ed. H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Paris 1968 f.) bk. 1, chap. 29, pp. 123-124. 
Tr. Janowitz, 1991: 368-369. See also Shaw, 1995: 179 ff. ("Naming the Gods"). 
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of the words (Hirschle, 1979: 20).48 Be it noted that Proclus distinguishes three kinds of 
words: divine, daemonic, and human. Divine words are closest to their objects, they are 
‘coexistent’ with them, daemonic words less so, and human words have only limited 
similarity with their objects. Obviously human words are least capable of consequent 
etymological analysis. The situation is quite different with the secret names of gods, 
whose efficacy is the result of specially efficacious combinations of sounds.49 Hirschle 
(1979: 27-28) draws in this connection attention to certain secret names of gods found 
in Greek magical papyri from Egypt, which belong to no known language: "Es sind 
scheinbar bedeutungslose Namen, nichts anderes als bizarre Lautkombinationen, die bis 
zu 100 und mehr Buchstaben umfassen können". The parallelism with the meaningless 
b¥jamantras of Tantrism is striking. Both in India and in the Hellenistic world, it 
appears, the search for the elementary constituents of language went hand in hand with 
the postulation of higher levels of language, in which ordinary meanings are no longer 
present. 
 This is of course not the place for a general exposition of Neoplatonic 
philosophy as a whole, of which the above ideas about magic and etymologizing are 
part. For our present purposes it suffices to retain the following observation: 
Neoplatonism explained both the effectiveness of magical rites and the revealing 
potential of etymologies with the help of one mechanism, that of cosmic sympathy. 
Cosmic sympathy creates a network that links similar objects, and similar words, to 
each other, and to higher forces with which they share features. Cosmic sympathy is 
possible because the world is a living organism. 
 Neoplatonic ideas played a major role in the ‘natural magic’ that exerted much 
influence in Renaissance Europe (Walker, 1958; Yates, 1964; cf. Hadot, 1982). This 
magic — as Thomas M. Greene points out (1997: 262) — requires the assumption that 
there is an inherent correspondence if not an identity between sign and its object, that 
there is a natural language and a natural semiotics.50 It comes as no surprise that 
sixteenth century critics of magic emphasize the conventional nature of language, 
which is the exact opposite of the position maintained by the upholders of magic (ibid. 
p. 255 f.). The same period has an interest in etymology.51 For Petrus Ramus etymology 
                                                
48 This interest in non-historical etymologies is all the more striking in view of the fact that someone like 
Varro, many centuries before Proclus, seems to have made what he considered were historical 
etymologies (Pfaffel, 1980; cf. Barwick, 1957: 66f.; Desbordes, 1991: 150). Regarding Plotinus' views on 
etymologizing, see Heiser, 1991: 20: "Plotinus himself has no comment to make on Plato's project in the 
Cratylus, and his occasional use of a Platonic etymology is not enough to indicate his view of the matter." 
49 According to Iamblichus, the seven vowels were connatural with the seven planetary gods; Shaw, 
1995: 185 f. 
50 Cp. Vickers, 1984: 95: "The occult tradition does not recognize [the] distinction [between words and 
things and between literal and metaphorical language]: Words are treated as if they are equivalent to 
things and can be substituted for them." 
51 The term ‘paradigm-change’ has been used (Gerl, 1982) to describe the changed views on language 
between Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444) and Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597). 
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"means that one looked in it to discover, not the original meanings of words, but the 
intrinsic properties of letters, syllables, and, finally, whole words" (Foucault, 1966: 35). 
The situation is similar "in the Neoplatonic and cabalistic exegesis of texts and analyses 
of language, such as one finds in Pico or Fabio Paolini. You have a significant whole, a 
text ... which can be analysed into still significant parts, words (or propositions); then 
you go a stage further and try to find elements of the significance of the whole in single 
letters ..., where in fact they do not exist." (Walker, 1958: 118). The interest in 
etymologies initially centered on Hebrew, the first language, but then extended to other 
languages as well (Maillard, 1991; Dubois, 1970: 80 f.). Even Leibniz, though critical 
of the idea of an original ‘Ursprache’, as the mystic Böhme called it, came to accept "a 
modified form of the Platonic doctrine of the nature of language: ‘For languages have a 
certain natural origin, from the agreement of sounds with the dispositions of the mind 
[or ‘affects’], which the appearances of things excite in the mind. And this origin I 
believe occurs not merely in the primal language, but also in languages that have grown 
up later in part from the primal language and in part from the new usage of men 
dispersed over the globe.’" (Aarsleff, 1969: 88).52 
 
6. The importance of similarities in "magical" acts was already noted by 
anthropologists in the last century.53 We shall here consider some of the ways in which 
these anthropologists and their successors have tried to make sense of this observation, 
with the ultimate aim of discovering to what extent their theories can help us to explain 
etymologies. 
 Sir Edward Tylor (1865: 124; 1891: 115 f.), followed by Sir James Frazer, 
ascribed the frequent presence of similarities in acts of magic to a confusion between 
thought associations and objective connections, to the mistake of taking "ideal 
connections for real connections". Frazer (1922: 14), in particular, distinguished two 
principles of thought on which magic is based; he called them the Law of Similarity 
and the Law of Contact or Contagion. These two give rise to Homoeopathic or 
Imitative Magic and Contagious Magic respectively.54 Frazer explained these principles 
as "misapplications of the association of ideas" (p. 15). In spite of this, these two 
principles constituted, for Frazer, a faith, as is clear from the following citation (p. 63-
                                                
52 Closely similar ideas are found in ancient China (Needham, 1956: 253f.). Needham points at the 
connection with Frazer's ‘law of similarity’ (p. 280) and with the correlations accepted in Renaissance 
Europe (p. 296f.). It is not necessary to believe that these ideas in different parts of the world must be 
explained by mutual influence, as Needham (p. 297f.) tends to think. Rather, it appears that the idea that 
similar things act on similar things is a rather obvious rationalization of the presumed effectiveness of 
certain magical and related ‘facts’. 
53 For a recent survey, see Cunningham, 1999. 
54 The discussion of magic was introduced in the second edition of The Golden Bough, which came out in 
1900; see Ackerman, 1987: 166 f. Ackerman, referring to E.E. Evans-Pritchard, calls this analysis of 
magic "Frazer's single most important contribution to the anthropology of religion". 
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64): "Wherever sympathetic magic occurs in its pure unadulterated form, it assumes 
that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably without the 
intervention of any spiritual or personal agency. Thus its fundamental conception is 
identical with that of modern science; underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit 
but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature." The Law of Similarity he 
described as the principle "that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause", 
the Law of Contact or Contagion as the principle "that things which have once been in 
contact with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical 
contact has been severed" (p. 14). However, "the primitive magician ... never reflects on 
the abstract principles involved in his actions. With him ... logic is implicit, not 
explicit"; "he tacitly assumes that the Laws of Similarity and Contact are of universal 
application and are not limited to human actions" (p. 15). 
 Tylor and Frazer have frequently been criticized by more recent 
anthropologists.55 "Perhaps one of the most devastating criticisms levelled against Tylor 
(that is equally appropriate to Frazer) is his never posing the question why primitives 
would mistake ideal connections for real ones in one domain when they do not do so in 
their other activities. As Evans-Pritchard puts it — and in this he and Malinowski stand 
together —: ‘The error here was in not recognizing that the associations are social and 
not psychological stereotypes, and that they occur therefore only when evoked in 
specific ritual situations, which are also of limited duration ...’"56 
 Frazer's ‘laws’, too, have been severely criticized. Beattie, for example, 
observed (1964: 206): "Nobody in their senses could possibly believe that all things that 
share some common quality, and all things that have once been in contact, are 
continually affecting one another; in a world so conceived almost everything would all 
the time be affecting almost everything else, and all would be chaos."57 Tambiah (1968: 
37) remarked, similarly: "... Frazer's principles ... lead to absurd inferences about the 
logic of magic." 
 Here it is to be recalled that Frazer did not himself subscribe to this conception 
of the world. Quite on the contrary, he attributed it to those who practise and believe in 
magic. Frazer's critics are no doubt right in thinking that most magicians and their 
followers do not entertain such a conception, but saying that "nobody in their senses 
could possibly believe" in it certainly goes too far. We have seen that a respectable 
school of philosophy, Neoplatonism, adhered to ideas very similar to those formulated 
                                                
55 Cp. Douglas, 1978. Ackerman (1998: 129) observes: "By the late 1960s the reputation[...] of Frazer 
[was] about as low as [it] could be. Whenever an anthropologist interested in the history of the idea of 
‘primitive’ religion bothered to consider Frazer, he was regarded as wholly lacking in redeeming 
intellectual value, the very model of how not to do anthropology or think about religion". 
56 Tambiah, 1990: 51, with a quotation from Evans-Pritchard, 1933: 29. 
57 See further Skorupski, 1976: 138 f. 
ETYMOLOGY AND MAGIC   29 
 
 
by Frazer, and was capable of inspiring thinkers many centuries later.58 Indeed, recent 
research suggests that Frazer may have formulated his theories under the direct or 
indirect influence of Renaissance thought.59 In fact, our preceding exposition has shown 
that also those who tried to give a rational explanation, and justification, of the use of 
etymologies arrived at views not dissimilar to the ones which Frazer ascribed to his 
"primitives". While many anthropologists have, no doubt rightly, criticized Frazer for 
underestimating the amount of common sense in the people he describes, no one seems 
to have raised the equally valid criticism that he overestimated their desire, or tendency, 
to create rational systems of thought. 
 It is of course possible to maintain that Frazer's classification, as classification, 
leaves to be desired. This is John Skorupski's position, who in his Symbol and Theory 
(1976) proposes instead the following modified classification: symbolic identification 
and contagious transfer. The importance of identification in the first of these two is 
emphasized: "The symbol in some sense is, or participates in, the reality it represents." 
(Skorupski, 1976: 144). It is not difficult to see that this modified classification, and in 
particular the symbolic identification which Skorupski recognizes in a part of so-called 
magical acts, are as useful as Frazer's Law of Similarity, if not more so, to make sense 
of etymologies. David Freedberg, speaking about images in particular, maintains60 that 
many theories, from Frazer's laws of similarity and contagion to more contemporary 
notions of sympathy, identification, symbolic linkage, association of ideas, evocative 
resonance of symbols, or what have you, assume the disjunction between the symbol 
and the symbolized — between representation and reality. But this is precisely what is 
not given at the level of our emotional and cognitive response to images. Hence he says 
(Freedberg, 1989: 436): "we will only come to understand response if we acknowledge 
more fully the ways in which the disjunction ... lapses when we stand in the presence of 
images." Once again it is possible without difficulty to transfer this to the understanding 
of semantic etymologies. 
 A more serious criticism would be to doubt the belief of the actors in the 
efficacy of magical acts. Gilbert Lewis puts it as follows (1994: 568): "Take, for 
example, sorcery as an example of magical belief. If we assume a man's true and literal 
belief in his sorcery, then either violence or the sorcery will seem to be ways to harm 
his enemy. The sorcery might substitute for the violence. But if we slacken the certainty 
                                                
58 Similar ideas existed in China, too; see Henderson, 1984: ch. 1 ("Correlative thought in early China"). 
59 Cp. Hanegraaff, 1998: 266: "[Frazer's] sympathetic magic can be divided into homeopathic (imitative, 
mimetic) and contagious magic; a distinction which may well have been taken straight from Tylor's 
Researches who, in turn, could have found it in the great compendium of Renaissance magic: Agrippa's 
De occulta philosophia" and ibid. n. 47: "Tylor repeatedly quotes Agrippa in Primitive Culture". 
60 As presented in Sharf, 1999: 85. Sharf's own concern is primarily with Buddhist relics, which are "for 
all intents and purposes, formless" and do not represent or signify anything. For a presentation of the 
differences between Freedberg's and Skorupski's positions, see Freedberg, 1989: 274 ff. 
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of his belief, impute less of the literal to his statement, then his sorcery action may 
become that much more of an act which stands for something violent he would like to 
do but which he does not wholly dare, and perhaps not really desire, to carry out. It is a 
substitute, but a partial one. And it becomes in part symbolic to the man himself." This 
position, which seems to be representative of the majority of present-day thinkers in 
this domain, implies for homeopathic magic that its actors do not really think that 
similar things are related to each other. A parallelism with semantic etymologies is hard 
to maintain in this case. 
 Lewis expresses himself carefully in the above passage ("it becomes in part 
symbolic to the man himself") and further softens down his position in the next 
paragraph.61 He does not totally reject the idea that perhaps some practitioners of magic 
sometimes believe that there is after all some kind of connection between the substitute 
and the object it represents. For an analysis of the situation, we must consider S.J. 
Tambiah's Magic, science, religion, and the scope of rationality (1990). After 
discussing Tylor and Frazer, Tambiah turns to Malinowski's views on magic, and 
observes (p. 73): 
Malinowski had two specific insights into the internal structure and constitution 
of Trobriand rites. The first was that they exploited simultaneously both words 
and acts, both speech and the manipulation of objects and substances, thereby 
posing the problem of the logic of use of multiple media in ritual for his 
successors to ponder over. Secondly his so-called ‘ethnographic theory of the 
magical word’ proposed some illuminating insights which foreshadowed and 
anticipated in England Austin's ‘linguistic philosophical’ notions of 
performative force carried by speech acts, that is, how speech acts created both 
illocutionary and perlocutionary effects by virtue of being conventional acts; 
and in this country [= U.S.A., JB], Kenneth Burke's discussion of the ‘rhetoric 
of motives’. 
Yet Tambiah is not completely happy with Malinowski's position. Observing that "it 
would seem that we cannot yet completely exorcize the ghosts of Tylor and Frazer", he 
concedes that magic has a dual structure (p. 82-83): 
On the one hand, it seems to imitate the logic of technical/technological action 
that seeks to transform nature or the world of natural things and manifestations. 
On the other hand, its structure is also transparently rhetorical and performative 
(in that it consists of acts to create effects on human actors according to accepted 
social conventions). Tylor and Frazer fastened exclusively on the first equation 
                                                
61 Lewis, 1994: 568: "People must differ individually in how they view the truth of what they assert in 
common with others in their community ... Emotion and feeling as well as reason enter into the link 
between assertion and conviction ..." 
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and said it was bad science; Malinowski appreciated the force of the second 
equation and said that magic was constituted of speech acts in a performative 
and persuasive mode, and that therefore they were pragmatically reasonable. ... 
The now puzzling duality of magic will disappear only when we succeed in 
embedding magic in a more ample theory of human life in which the path of 
ritual action is seen as an indispensable mode for man anywhere and everywhere 
of relating to and participating in the life of the world. 
Tambiah's recognition of ‘the other side’ of magic would seem to be a major step 
forward with regard to his own earlier studies (e.g., Tambiah 1968, 1973) and those of 
others.62 Tambiah develops this idea further by distinguishing two ‘orientations to the 
world’, which he calls participation and causality. He then explains (p. 108): "Although 
‘causation’ and ‘participation’ may seem different or contrastive orientations to the 
world, the analyst must maintain that both are projected on the experiential and 
symbolizing capacities of the same sensory modalities of man — the modalities of 
touch, taste, hearing, seeing. ... If participation emphasizes sensory and affective 
communication and the language of emotions, causality stresses the rationality of 
instrumental action and the language of cognition. But these are ideal type 
exaggerations, and neither can exclude the devices of the other." In other words, at least 
some of the practitioners of magic do not totally exclude the idea that magic has a 
causal effect on the intended person or object. 
 The idea of multiple orientations to the world is plausible, and Tambiah presents 
a number of arguments which support it. This does not change the fact that his position 
remains in some respects very close to the one of Tylor and Frazer. These scholars had 
claimed that magic made the mistake of taking ideal connections for real connections. 
Tambiah rather speaks of an orientation, or ordering of reality, in which people believe 
in the causal efficacy of communicative acts. In both cases there is a mistake regarding 
objective reality.63 And in both cases this mistake finds its origin in the subjective 
                                                
62 See, e.g., Kilani, 1989: 126: "La magie est un langage symbolique, un mode de communication sociale, 
... L'efficacité d'un acte magique consiste dans le fait de dire des choses sur l'individu ou un groupe 
d'individus qui sont en train d'accomplir une action donnée. La magie a une efficacité sociale, elle peut 
dans certains cas se transformer en moyen de mobilisation sociale." Similarly Kilani, 1983: passim. 
Waardenburg, on the other hand, recognizes the objective connections that are supposed to underlie 
magical acts; see Waardenburg, 1986: 196: "Wesentlich bei diesen Völkern ist eine Grundanschauung 
von Zusammenhängen, die es zwischen den Dingen gibt." (The Dutch version of this book (1990: 203) 
speaks of "verbanden en samenhangen ... die wij in het Westen niet kennen" (‘relations and connections 
which we in the West do not know’).) H.E. Brekle, speaking from the point of view of ‘popular 
linguistics’, observes (1990: 42): "Ce qui est essentiel pour toutes sortes d'activités magiques à l'aide de 
moyens langagiers, c'est la foi ou la croyance dans les effets produits par la seule énonciation de certains 
mots ou de certaines formules. Cela implique que ces ‘croyants’ (exécuteurs et ‘victimes’) prennent pour 
assuré qu'il existe des rapports nécessaires et causaux, voire des rapports d'identité, entre le nom d'une 
chose et la chose elle-même, ou l'énonciation d'une formule et l'état de choses évoqué par cette formule." 
63 In spite of claims to the contrary, Freedberg would seem to admit the same in the following passage 
(Freedberg, 1989: 276; the use of ‘elide’ and ‘elision’ in this passage does not appear to have any of the 
meanings enumerated in the Webster's and the New Shorter Oxford English dictionaries; the index states 
under ‘Elision of image and prototype’: "See also Fusion of image and prototype" (p. 524)): "When we 
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realm.64 It appears, then, that Tambiah's latest attempt, in spite of its obvious strong 
sides, has indeed not been able to exorcise the ghosts of Tylor and Frazer.65 
 In a way Tambiah's latest position is not very different from the one presented 
by Skorupski already in 1976, in a work mentioned earlier. Skorupski, too, discusses 
the relationship between magic and performative acts; he speaks in this connection of 
operative actions. While emphasizing the identificationist view of symbolic magic, he 
concedes that magic can be incorporated within operative theory if it is interpreted as a 
way of triggering a consequential action, that is as "a way of signalling what is being 
done and thereby doing it" (Skorupski, 1976: 153; cp. Cunningham, 1999: 84). It is 
further interesting to note that L. Wittgenstein, who often appears to hold an expressive, 
anti-instrumental view of magic, elsewhere provides "the most persuasive arguments 
against his own anti-instrumental objections, so that what we have is more a matter of 
genuine ambivalence than simple inconsistency".66 
 
7. Let us now return to our main subject matter, semantic etymologies. Does the 
above discussion about magical acts help us to understand these etymologies better? It 
does if we assume — with Tambiah, with Skorupski and, yes, with Frazer — that at 
least in certain cases magical acts are believed "to transform nature or the world of 
natural things and manifestations" (Tambiah). In other words, things are accepted — in 
specific circumstances perhaps — to be related to or identical with certain other things 
which they resemble. This does not have to mean that all things are related to or 
identical with everything that they resemble, even though this belief has occasionally 
been maintained (e.g. in Renaissance magic), as we have seen. The apparently wide-
spread conviction that similarity can indicate relatedness or identity between things 
                                                                                                                                         
see the resembling image, we elide it with the living prototype it represents ... This tendency to elision 
does not happen by some kind of magical process. It is part of cognition and it lies at the root of the belief 
in the efficacy of ‘magical’ images. Aware of the supervening tendency to abstract and differentiate, 
makers of defamatory or magical images encourage the elision, and set out to preempt the move to 
differentiation." 
64 This, of course, opens the way to psychological explanations, such as the one offered by C.R. Hallpike 
(1979: 429), which draws on the work of Piaget: "Ethnographic literature is replete with examples of the 
way in which primitives treat mental and bodily conditions and processes, properties and qualities of 
physical objects, and physical processes, as well as conditions of society such as ill luck, sin, and general 
ill health, as entities which can be transmitted from man to nature, from one natural object to another, and 
from natural objects to man, in an enormous variety of ways. The true significance of this cognitive 
phenomenon is not so much that it is a case of Frazer's homeopathic magic, of ‘like producing like’, as of 
the pre-operatory propensity to isolate particular phenomena and treat them as bounded entities which can 
be detached from their physical context with absolute properties and an inner dynamism of their own. 
The reification of process in particular is a notable example of this proclivity of mind ..." For an attempt 
to provide an evolutionary explanation of the two laws of sympathetic magic as observed in the 
psychology of disgust, see Pinker, 1997: 378 ff. 
65 One may also wonder — as did Sharpe a quarter century ago (1975: 94) — whether "[p]erhaps the time 
is now approaching when fashionable impatience with Frazer will give place to a sober estimate of his 
contribution to comparative religion in its anthropological aspect. He may then prove to have been 
greater, rather than smaller, than we thought." 
66 Cioffi, 1998: 155-182 ("Wittgenstein on making homeopathic magic clear"); quoted sentence on p. 
156. 
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allows us to make sense of semantic etymologies. These etymologies are meant to 
reveal the connections that exist between the words concerned, and consequently 
between the things denoted by them. 
 We must be careful not to attribute explicit convictions of this kind to all those 
who use semantic etymologies. This would be as mistaken as attributing similar ideas to 
those who practice homeopathic (or imitative) magic; this was Frazer's mistake, for 
which he has repeatedly been chided, as we have seen. Most users of semantic 
etymologies will not have any systematic world view that explains their assumed 
validity. In this respect they contrast with those users of magic who often "explain" the 
presumed efficacy of magical acts with the help of notions of spirits or something of the 
kind. An exception is constituted by certain Neoplatonic thinkers who, as we have seen, 
elaborated a view of the world in which similarities, also between words, played a 
central role. 
 How about the other explanation of magical acts that we have discussed? Is the 
notion of ‘speech acts in a performative and persuasive mode’ able to account for 
semantic etymologies? This is unlikely. Semantic etymologies are not performative acts 
and have no persuasive validity, as far as I can see; they certainly don't in early and 
classical Indian literature. Their aim appears to be to bring to light existing connections 
or identities (i.e., connections or identities that are presumed to exist), not to bring 
about new connections or to persuade others. 
 This leads us to the following conclusion. Semantic etymologies share with 
many acts of so-called sympathetic magic the underlying belief that similar things can 
be related to, or even identical with, each other. This belief is not normally systematized 
(with some rare exceptions), and indeed it is rarely formulated. It is for this reason 
perhaps better to speak of it as an intuition rather than as a consciously held belief. 
There is no claim that all similar things are related to each other (again with some rare 
exceptions), and it may be difficult to discern in each particular case why certain things 
rather than others are assumed to be thus connected. This intuition does not only 
account for the almost universal occurrence of sympathetic magic, but also for the 
equally quasi-universal use of semantic etymologies. 
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